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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
OF THE STATE o~F UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Pla.int~ff

and Res }JO ndc nt,

-vs.-

Case No. 9894

HUGH F. ROWLEY and DONALU
SPENCER,
Defendants mul Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF T'HE CASE
Tlw defendants were convicted of the crirnes of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Section 76-7-6,
e.C.A. 1953, and attempted burglary, in violation of See-

tions 76-1-30 and 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, and appeal from
those convictions.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the convictions of the defendants should be affirmed.
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STATE~1J1~XT

OF FACTS

The respondent subn1its the following state1uent of
facts: On October 21, 1962, .at approximately 8:00 p.11l.,
:Jir. \~ere Lancaster, an employee of the J. C. Penney
Company, went with his 15-year old son to the J. 8.
Penney Store in Tooele to check the store to ascertain
if everything was in proper order. ( R. 4). E pon entering
the store, he noticed a small pile of shavings on the floor
and a hole in the ceiling. (R. 6). Alarmed at this, he
started to search the store when his son indicated that he
heard .a sound like a brace being pulled from wood. (R.
7). l-Ie told his son to call the police and then heard
someone running. He went out into the alley behind the
J. C. Penney Store where he saw a n1an who had apparently jumped off the roof, holding .a revolver. (R. 7).
Upon the burglar observing ~Ir. Lancaster, he fired at
hi1n three tin1es, wounding ~Ir. Lancaster twice. (R. 8).
}[r. Lancaster called for help and three men came out
of Allen's Food Town, adjacent to the J. C. Penney Store.
The burglar then fired in their direction, striking }lr.
Sidney Srnith and :Mr. Dennis Jensen. }[r. Smith noticed
that the burglar dropped his glasses as he fired in his
direction. (R. 1±). lllr. S1nith retrieved these glas:)es and
they were thereafter ,identified by Dr. Bruce J. Parsons,
Optometrist, as being the glasses of the defendant, Donald Spencer (R. 18), having unique ri1ns and the same
prescription as glasses he had fitted for the defPndant
Spencer.
Ja1nes T. Portwood, a soldier stationed at Dugway
Proving Grounds and residing in the I(irk Hotel (H. 32),
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upon hearing the shots, looked out his window and ~.a w
an individual with a revolver (R. 3-l:) who was li1nping
badl;· (R. 35) get into a running car on the opposite side
of the driver (R. 35) and drive away. The car was described as a 1953 green and cream colored Dodge. (R.
36). .Jlr. Portwood indicated that there were two men
in the car as it was driven away. (R. 36).
Police officials retrieved a spent slug in the vicinity
of the J. C. Penney Store (R. 62), which "Was identified
a~ a .357 l\fagnun1 bullet. Burglary equipment was recovered from the roof of the J. C. Penney Store. (R. 61).
Additionally, heel prints were taken from the roof of the
store as evidence. (R. 63).
At approxiinatelr 9:00 P.M. on the same night, on
the road from Tooele to Lehi, police officers stopped a
1953 Dodge, ±-door, 2-toned "white and green automobile,
having been alerted by l\Ir. Portwood as to the description. In the vehicle were the defendants Spencer and
Rowle.'·· Spencer was armed with a .357 1Iagnuin pistol
in his belt, and Rowley had a .38 caliber pistol in his
belt. (R. -±-+ through 47). Officer Yincent exan1ined the
pistol in the possession of Spencer and indicated that it
smelled like it had been recently fired. At the time of
the defendants being stopped by police officials, they
were approximately -±7 miles from Tooele. (R. 56). :Mr.
Portwood identified the vehicle as the car into which he
had seen the man carrying the revolver enter after he
had heard the shooting in Tooele. At the time of the
arrest of the defendants, the appellant Spencer walked
with a limp and appeared to have a badly swollen ankle.

3
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(R. 71). The footprjnts taken frmn the J. C. Penney
Store m.atched the shoes of the defendant Rowley in
depth, width, na1ne and design. ( R. 66). At the time the
defendants were stopped they had in their possession additional ammunition, wood punches and small chisels.
The defendant Spencer, who was driving, wa:s searched,
and it was revealed that his driver's license called for
adequate glasses, which he was not wearing. ( R. -19).
The defendant Spencer took the stand, admitted being in Tooele on the night in question, but stated it wa::;
later in the evening, adJ:nitted that he was in Tooele with
Rowley (R. 78), but stated that he did not cmnmit the
crime. He said that he had the pistol in his possession
because he had been doing some shooting earlier that
day, and that he put the gun in his belt when he sa\v the
road block. (R. 82-83). He said that he had done this
because he was an ex convict, having two felony convictions (R. 79), and felt that it would cause him difficulty
if they found guns in the car. The defendant said he had
lost the glasses that Dr. Parsons had prescribed and
prepared for him (R. 78), and that the glasses that \Yere
adrnitted as Exhibit 7 were not his. Alice Beckstead,
with whom the defendant said he had been earlier in
the day, testified that at the time she was with him he
\Vas wearing glasses. ( R. 91). The defense counsel, at
the conclusion of the appellant Spencer's testimony,
made the following proposed stipulation:
"MR. HANSEN: We would like to make a
stipulation in regard to a pDlygraph test with the
defendant, Hugh Rowley.
4
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~Iay it be stipulated, Robert McManarna, an
officer in the Salt Lake City Police Department,
gave a polygraph test to Hugh Rowley, that ~fr.
McManama is a qualified person to give such
examination; that :Mr. Rowley denied he had anything to do with these particular offenses, and
that Officer l\1cManama was of the opinion he
was not telling ~the truth when he made these
statements :

It is also requested that the District Attorney stipulate at the present time, the degree of
accuracy of the polygraph tests is approximately
99 degrees accurate.
May it be so

stipulated~

MR. BLACK: We are certainly agreeable to
that stipulation, your Honor."
The stipulation as to the results of the polygraph test
were agreed to by the prosecution even though the stipulation was offered by the defense.
Prior to the tilne of trial, the defendants filed a
notice of alibi and a request for a polygraph exan1ination. (File Xo. 811). The defense counsel further entered
into a written stipulation with the prosecution requesting
the polygraph exanrination and requesting that the results thereof be introduced into evidence, and indicating
that he had explained the import of the examination and
the stipulation to the defendants. (File No. 881). The
trial court, after the receipt of all the testimony and evidence, instructed the jury, and no exceptions to the instructions appear of record. The iury returned a verdict
of guilty and the defendanti-l were committed to the Stat<'
Prison.
5
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO BASIS TO CLAIM ANY
ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL OF THEIR CONVICTIONS
WITH REFERENCE TO THE READING OF THE INFORMATION SINCE:
A.

THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNLESS AFFIRMATIVELY PROVED TO THE CONTRARY AND NO
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE APPEARS TO REFUTE
THE PRESUMPTION.

B.

APPELLANTS WAIVED ANY ERROR BY FAILING TO OBJECT.

C.

ANY SUCH ERROR WAS A MINOR IRREGULARITY
THAT COULD NOT HAVE PREJUDICED THEIR
CASE.

The appellants contend that there was a failure, at
trial, to read the information and plea of ~the appellants
to the jury, and that this was such an error as to vitiate
their convictions. It is sub1nitted that there was no such
error. The transcript of the trial reflects that the reporter 1nerely sun1marized the proceedings that occurred
in impaneling 'the jury and failed to 1nention that the
information was read. There does not appear to have
been an~· objection frmn defense counsel, which absence
would indicate regularity. ~-\_dditionally, no confusion
or questioning frmn the jury appears of record ·which
would support a conclusion that the inforn1ation was not
read. No affinnative proof appears of record that would
result in a conclusion that the provisions of 76-31-1,
U.C.A. 1953, requiring the reading of the information
6
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and plea, were not con1plied with. In 1 Wharton's Crilninal Evidence, Sec. 126, it is noted:
"It is rebuttably presumed that the variou~
phases of a criminal prosecution have conformed
to the requirements of the law. ***
''All judicial proceedings in courts of general
jurisdiction are presumed to be correct and regular, in the .absence of proof to the contrary. * * *
"Irregularities or error in the proceedings of
courts are never presumed, but must be affirmat~vely shown." (Emphasis supplied)
See also Abbott, CTiminal Trial Practice, -1-th Ed.,
Sec. 362.
In the instant case, where the record is sum1narized,
.and nothing appears therein that would support a showing of a failure to properly conduct the appellants' trial,
it must be presumed that proper trial requirements were
fully complied with. In State v. Reay, 13 l~tah 2d 79, 368
P.2d 595 (19·62) this court considered a contention that
error had been committed in reading to the jury an information for robbery and being an habitual crin1inal
before convietion on the robbery charge. The court rejected the contention, noting:
"The defendant would have us infer from the
foregoing that both courts were read t~o the jury
which would have been error. However, such .an
inference is not justified. In the absence of a
showing to the contrary, it is presumed that judicial proceedings were regular in all respects.
There is no affirmative showing that the second
count of the information was re.ad to the jury at
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the start of the trial upon the first charge. The
record is devoid of any objection being made with
respect to the reading of the information."
Consequently, in the instant case where the reporter
has obviously summarized the record, the presu1nption
of regularity of judicial proceedings requires a conclusion that there is no basis for error.
Secondly, it is submitted that even were such an
error committed, the appellants 1nay not complain, because they failed to object to the irregularity at the time
of its occurrence or any tilne during trial. In 2-1 C.J.S.,
Cnminal Law, § 1673 (4), it is noted that as a general
rule the failure to object to an irregularity will be deemed a waiver, and it is stated:
"The general rule has been applied to objections that the indictn1ent was not read to the jury.

* *

'~"

Numerous courts have ruled ·that the failure to object to an irregularity in the reading of an indictment or
inforrnation constitutes a waiver. Dabney r. Comnwnwealth, :226 K~y. 119, 10 S."\V. 2d 612 (1928); Crag 1:.
Com:JnOnLcealth, 5 Ky. L. 329; People v. 1lloonstan, 17
Cal. Rptr. 79 (1961); Orner 1'. State, 78 Tex. Cr. -115, 183
S."\V. 1172 (1916).
Finally, it is submitted that even were the appellants
in a position to claim error, any failure to read the infonnation would at best be hannless error. It is, of
course, acknowledged that the purpose of the reading
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of the infonuation and plea is to apprise the jury of the
fort1woming proceedings, State u. Solomon, 93 Utah 70,
71 P.:2d 10-l: (1937), but where no obvious confusion existed, where opening argun1ents were rnade, closing arguments given, and instructions rendered, it could hardiy
be said that the accuseds were prejudiced. In State 'li.
Telford, 89 Utah 22, 56 P.2d 1362 (1936), a claim of error
was presented before this court based upon a failure of
the court to read or state the plea of the defendant of
''former conviction" t!o the information of persistent
liquor law violations. This court held the faliure to be
error, but then stated that the failure must be weighed
for specific prejudice. The court found that there was
none, noting:
''It appears, therefore, that the proof tendered in support of the plea of former conviction
was in1material and would not have supported
it. Failure to read or state to the jury a plea in
regard to which there was no evidence to support
it is not prejudicial."
Two things should be observed from the Telford
case. First, the court expressly noted that the objection
was taken which would preserve the issue for appellate
review and disallow a presumption of regularit~r, and,
secondly, that the court determined that no prejudice
occurred.
In 24A C.J.S., Criminal Laze, § 1898, p. 937, 1958, it
is stated:
"A conviction will not be reversed for errors
occurring in the conduct of the trial, where not-withstanding the errors, substantial justice has
9
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been done accused. The rule has been applied to
alleged errors as to: * * * reading, or failure to
read, the statute, indictment, or plea to the jury.''
:\[any cases have failed to find prejudice from the
failure to read an information: State v. Dawson, 2+5
Iowa 747, 6·3 N.W. 2d 917 (1954); People v. Ross, 98 C.~-\.
2d 805, 221 P.2cl 280 (1950); State 1./. Ayres, 70 Ida. 18,
211 P.2d 1-±2. In Dabney v. Commonu·ealth, 226 Ky. 119,
10 S. W. 2d 612 ( 1928), the court considered a matter
identical with that urged here and refused to find error,
noting:
"* * * It [the record] further shows that both
sides announced ready f.or trial, and a jury was
impaneled and sworn. The bill of exceptions manifests that counsel for the commonwealth and the
defendant respectively stated the case to the jury.
The testimony was fully heard and strictly confined to the issue made by the indic;hnent and the
plea of not guilty. The jury was adequately instructed, and a verdict returned, responding literally to ·the charge, saying:
'We, the jury, find the defendant, Roy
Dabney, guilty as charged in the indictment,
and fix his punishment 'at two years in the
state penitentiary.'
"No objections or exceptions on the part of
the defendant to a failure, if there was a failure,
to read the indictment to the jury or to state his
plea, appear in the bill of exceptions. The bill of
exceptions does not show affinnatively any such
omission.

* * *
"The purpose of the law is fully satisfied
when the defendant is informed of the issue which
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he has to meet, and the jury is advised of the
charge it is called upon to try."
Certainly whe·re the Pvidence of guilt is as conclusive as it is in the instant case, no prejudice can be
clailned. 77-42-1, U.C.A. 19·53.

POINT II.
THE APPELLANTS CAN CLAIM NO PREJUDICE
FROM THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY WITH REFERENCE TO RECEIPT OF A STIPULATION, PROPOSED AND OFFERED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, ON THE RESULTS OF A LIE DETECTOR TEST.

The appellants contend that the trial court committed error in failing to give an instruetion on the stipulated results of a polygraph test given to the defendant
Hugh F. Rowley. 1 The lie detector test was perforrned
on Rowley by his own request. The trail defense counsel filed on January 11, 1963 a "Request for Polygraph
Examinations" on behalf of both defendants, which
stated:
"The above defendants and witness named
hereby reques~t polograph exa1ninations to aid in
determining the truthfulness of their a1ihi and
their declarations of innocense and stipulate the
results thereof and any stateinents made in the
course thereof may be admitted in e·vidence."
On January 21, 19·63, the defendants filed a stipulation, which stated:
"In aid of their defenses to the charge of attempted second degree burglary and assault with
a deadly weapon alleged to have been committed
11
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in Tooele, City, Utah on or about the 21st day of
October 1962, they request that a polygraph test
be given to Hugh Rowley and that regardless of
results thereof said results may be used either
by themselves individually or jointly or by the
State 'Of Utah and they herein specifically request
and consent to the introduction in evidence of the
polygraph test as evidence in their trial by themselves or by the District Attorney in the rrhird
Judicial District Court of Utah, in and for Tooele
County."
Thereafter, a statement of defense counsel appeared
under the stipulation, which stated:
"Comes now Robert B. Hansen, Attorney for
both of the above named defendants, and alleges
that he has explained the legal import of the above
to each of the defendants prior to their executing
their stipulation above and further affirms that
they entered into such stipulation upon advise of
counsel and without any undue influence or coercion and did so voluntarily. The undersigned
as their attorney further agrees and consents to
said stipulation."
Thereafter, the District Attorney c-onsented to the
stipulation in a one-line acknowledgment.
At the tin1e of trial, defense counsel, not the prosecution, offered the stipulation as to Rowley. The stipulation was merely that Rowley had denied any connection
with the offenses, and that the polygraph operator was
of the opinion that the defendant was not telling the
truth.
1. It should be noted as to this matter that any error that
might exist is limited to the defendant Rowley.
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~·o

instruction "·as tendered by the appellant nor
was any exception taken to the failure to give an instruction. The appellant relies upon an advisory opinion of
the AriZiona Supreme Court, State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz.
:n.t, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), wherein that court, upon certification after conviction, and without weighing for
error, laid down some guidelines for handling the admission on stipulation of the results of lie detector tests.
The court said the trial court should instruct the jury
on its purpose and weight. It did not state that the failure to do so would be prejudicial error ·or consider the
que·stion of the absence of an instruction ·or exception.
Several recent cases have allowed the use of stipulated testin1ony on the results of a lie detector test, apparently allowing their adlnissibility without reference
to limiting instructions. State v. 1ll eN arnara, 104 N.\V.
2d 568 (Iowa 1960); People l.·. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d
686, 193 p .2d 937.
Consequently, unless there is some substantial prejudice, no error should be allowed to be claimed, especially
where the appellant ·was the moving force for the admii5sion of the testimony, and failed to tender instructions
or request any. To now, for the first time on appeal,
allow the appellant to claim error, would allow hi1n to
benefit hy self-induced error. In State v. Rivenlmrgh,
11 t~tah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), this court noted:
'•It is of course not error for the court not
to give an instruction where it is not asked. This
assignment of error is without 1nerit."
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In State 'L 1lliller, 111 l'tah ~33, 177 P.:2<l 7:27 (19-l-7).
this court "'as presented with a clain1 that the trial court
committed error for failing to instruct on the limited
purpose of the use of the defendant's confession. No rPquest for such an instruction had been n1ade. The court
noted:
"This requirement that the court instruct
'upon the law applicable to the case' does not
place upon the court alone the burden of making
up instructions which cover every question which
may have arisen in the case.
"The general rule is that unless the party
requests an instruction on a special matter he
cannot predicate error upon the court's failure
to charge. * * * The tenor of the cases we have
considered, and here cite, support our holding
that this case cannot be returned for a new trial
because of the court's fiailure to give a proper
instruction lilniting the use of ~filler's confession
when no such instruction 'vas requested. ***"
This has long been the rule of la-w in this jurisdiction.
State r. Anderson, 108 Ftah 130, 158 P.:2d 1:27: People
v. Robinson, G Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; State v. TVoodall,
6 Ftah :2d 8, 305 P.2d 473: State v. Peterson, 1:21 Utah
229, 240 P.2d 50-t.
Additionally, where no exception was taken to failto instruct on the effect of lie-detector evidenre, no
error can be daimed. State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28
P.2d 175 (1934); Abbott, Cri1ninal Trial Practice, 4th
Ed. Sec. 672.
1UP

Consequently, appellant Rowley is without a meritorious clailn on this point.
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POINT III.
APPELLANT CAN CLAIM NO ERROR FROM THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON ATTEMPTED BURGLARY
SINCE:
A.

NO EXCEPTION WAS TAKEN.

B.

THE ERROR COMPLAINED OF IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

C.

NO PREJUDICE COULD HAVE RESULTED.

The appellants contend that the trial court erred in
it~ instruction on the elements of the law of atten1pt. The
appellants contend that the court should have instructed
on the failure to consummate the offense. It is submitted
that there is no merit to the appellants' contentions. 2
First, it is submitted th!at the appellants have no
basis to object, since no exception was ta:ken to the instruction given. 77-37-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that exceptions to instructions shall he "taken and preserved
as in civil cases." The general rule is said to preclude a
review of instructions unless an exception has preserved
the contention for review ·on appeal. Thus it is noted
in Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, .fth Ed., Sec. 672:
"The correctness of instructions given or refused cannot be questioned in the appellate court
unless a tin1ely exception was saved in the trial
court *** ."
2. This issue of claimed error goes only to the conviction
of the crime of attempted second degree burglary.
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The Utah eases have given force to this rule. In State
r. Smith, +3 Utah 381, 14-G Pae. 286 (1915), it \Ya~ said:
"So it would require hard struggling to defend and support portions of the charge, both as
to substance and consistency * * *. But there
is no exception, no assignment, and no elai1n m1ade
as to this nor to any portion of the charge. \V e
thus leave that."
In State 'L Ferguson, 83 l-tah 35'7, 28 P.:Z(l 1/;)
(1934), it was said:
"Other errors are assigned to instructions
given to the jury, but, as no exceptions theret'o
appear of record, they, of course cannot be considered."
Subsequent decisions have modified the ~tric.t t>xeeption rule noted above. Thus, in State v. Cabo, 90 rtah
89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), it was said:
"\Y e wish not to depart frmn the rule laid
down in this jurisdictioon that in ordinary cases on
appeal errors relating to instructions or refusing
requests to instruct will not be considered or reviewed unless exceptions thereto were properly
taken by the party cmnplaining. But in capital
cases and in eases of grave and serious charged
offenses and convictions of long terms of impris-onment, cases involving the life and liberty
of the citizen, we think that when palpable error
is made to appear on the face of the record and
to the manifest prejudice of the accused, the court
has the power to notice such error and to correct
the same, though no fonnal exception was taken
to the ruling. * * *"
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Later cases have also given recognition to the possible
exct>ption. J::Jtate 1/. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P.2d
504; State v. Hines, 6 U.2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957).
The precedent, therefore, will excuse the failure to take
an exception only if the error is palpable and so flagrant
as to deny a fair trial.
It is submitted that the instruction given was nort so
palpably erroneous as to warrant a claim orf error in the
absence of an exception. If the court had instructed differently and included a phrase on the failure to consurnmate the offense, it could not have helped the appellants.
76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
''Any act done with intent to comn1it a crime,
and tending hut failing to effect its CJOlmnission,
is an attempt to commit .a crime. Any person may
be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it a;ppe.ars on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt, unless the court,
in i h; discretion, discharges the jury and directs
such person to be tried for such crime."
The above statute allows the conviction of an accused
for atten1pt even where it .appears from the evidence that
the crin1e was consurnmated. In the instant case, the
evidence shows that the appellants had already bored
two holes into the building. This is sufficient to constitute "entry" and to consumrn.ate the offense. Thus, in
Clark & ~larshall, Crimes, 6th Ed. (1958), it is noted:
"·The slightest entry, however, is sufficient
if it be with felonious intent. * * * It need not
be of any part of the body, but an entry n1ay be
rnade by an instn1n1ent where the instru1nent is
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inserted for the purpose of cmnn1itting the felony.

* * *"
In State v. Crawford, 8 K.D. 539, 80 K.\\.... 193
(1899), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
boring into a grainery and the insertion of the auger
into the grainery w'as sufficient entry to make out the
crnne.
Thus, appellants would argue that, if the crirne were
not interrupted and consummated, they would be entitled
to a;cquittal of the attempt charge. This was true at
common la,v, but in states having statutes lrke ours, consurnmation is no defense. Consequently, there is no reason to instruct on such an issue. A careful analy:-:is of
the law in this area supports a view that where consummation of the crime rnay still be punished as an attempt,
the absence of conslunnration is not a part of the crirne.
Thus, Clark & Marshall, Cri-me.s, 6th Ed., § +.1 + (193S).
correctl;r states:
"Because of the dominating idea that an e:ssential elernent of a criminal atternpt lies in the
failure to consurnmate the target crime aimed at
by the accused, questions have arisen when such
crime has been completed whether there can be a
conviction for an attempt. This situation is typified by People v. Lardner. 'There the ac.cused
was indicted for larceny, and the only evidence
offered by the prosecution est'ablished proof of
larceny, but a verdict of 'attempt to cmnmit larceny' was returned. Reversing the judgment and
remanding the case, the Illinois court stated: 'A
failure to consummate the crime is as rnuch an
essential element of an attempt as the intent and
the performance of an overt act toward its com-
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Inission. Evidence that a cri1ne has been comInitted will not sustain a verdict for an attempt
to cmn1nit it, be0ause the essential element of interception or prevention of execution is lacking.'
While the Lardner court recognized the theory
that where an indictment charges an offense
which includes ( § 2.03) a lesser offense a defendant acquitted of the higher offense may be convicted of the lesser, it refused application of
that rule to statutory .attempts 'because an essential element of the attempt is a failure to consumInate the crime.'
"In short, the Illinois court held, in substance,
that only behavior described as 'a direct ineffectual act toward the commission of crime' is within
the ambit of the statute proscribing and punishing attempts ; that consummation of the crime,
larceny in this case, took Lardner's behavior out
of the reach of the statutory definition of attempt.
"But a different result can he reached' in
jurisdictions \vhere there is a general statutory
provision running in the tern1s of Rule 31, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz. : an accused 'may he found guilty of an offense neces~arily included in the offense charged or of an
atte1npt to commit either the offense charged' or
an offense ne cessarily included therein if the attenlpt is an offense.' Jones v. State is a state
case, decided under a statutory provision similar
to the FedePal Rule, where' the defendant was indicted and tried for rape and convicted of an attempt to commit that felony. Jones admitted the
act but claimed the female consented. His conviction was affirmed although the court recognized
the fact that the crime was consum1nated. This
decision rests primarily on the express statutory
language.
1
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"At connnon law there could be no conviction
where the intended (target) crime was completed.
The difference between decisions following Jones
and those adopting the Lardner view lies in express legislative approval of convictions for attempts though the crime aimed at was c01npleted,
e.g., committed. Such legislation frequentl.'·
makes the crime of an 'attempt to' an included
crime and permits conviction for a lesser offense.
In J·ones, supra, there is a conviction of a lesser
( c01npared with rape) offense, e.g., an attempt to
commit a felony. Of course, the problems of merger of offenses and former jeopardy can, and do,
arise in these situations."
Perkins, Criminal Law (1958), p. 477, analyzes the
very proposition urged in the instant case by appellants
and rejects it as an absurdity. It is stated:

"* * * ·To insure against such a conclusion a
number of the statutes expressly provide that a
person may be convicted of an attempt to c01nn1it
a crime although it appears on the trial that the
crime attempted was perpetrated by the defendant. It has been rather common to authorize conviction of an attempt to con1mit the crime charged
in the indictment. This type of statute does not
expressly authorize conviction of an attempt
"rhere the proof shows success, - nor does it expressly exclude it. Such a provision does not require submission of the attempt issue where there
is no evidence to warrant it. A defendant who
has been convicted of the offense charged is not
entitled to a reversal by reason of the judge's refusal to submit the attempt issue where there
was no evidence of an atte1npt that failed. The
real test comes at another point. Suppose in such
a trial the uncontradicted evidence shows beyond
doubt that defendant attempted to commit the of20
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fense charged, but there is conflict in the testimony as to whether the attempt succeeded or
failed. Smne of the statements on the subject, if
carried to their logical conclusion, would entitle
the defendant to an instruction which would tell
the jury in substance: (1) they must acquit the
defendant of the completed offense unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempt
was successful; (2) they must acquit the defendant of an attempt to commit the offense unless
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempt failed. In other words the position would
be that defendant is entitled to a verdict of not
guilty if there is doubt in regard to success or
failure although no doubt that the attempt was
made. There is no proper basis for such a position, and probably no court would carry the unsound notion to such an absurd extreme."
Clearly, therefore, the court committed no error in
failing to instruct on consummation, and especially so
\\·here the Utah statute would render the instruction erroneous, and no exception was taken to the instruction
given. The Utah statute was apparently taken frorn California which has a substantively identical provision,
Cal. Penal Code § 663. California courts have taken the
position that there are only two elements to the crime
of atten1pt: (1) a specific intent to com1nit the principal
c-rime, and (:2) a direct act towards the co1nn1ission of
the crime. The California Suprerne Court has recognized
that failure to consumn1ate the cri1ne is no longer an
element of attempt under the California statute, Peo1Jle
v. Tkur·man, 62 C.A.1-!7, 216 Pac. 394 (1923):

"* * * In the absenee of such a permis~·:ive
statutory provision as that which is eontained in
21
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section 663 of our Penal Code, it has been held
that where a defendant is charged ·with an attempt to comrnit a crin1e he cannot be convicted
if the evidence shows that he actually consummated the crirne. * * *"
See Per.kins, Criminal Attempt and Related Pro!Jlems, 2 U.C.L.A., L. Rev. 319 (1D33).
In State v. Lore, 210 La. 11, :W So. 2d 13G (1946),
the Louisiana Supre1ne Court considered the new Louisiana statute silimar to that of Utah, and stated:
"Failure of consummation is not an essential
element of such an attempt. Under paragraph
three an attempt is not merged in the completed
offense, and a person m.ay be convicted of an attempt to comrnit a crirne, if it appears on the trial
that the crime was actually consummated."
The appellants contend that State L". Priuce, 73 rtah
205, :2S-b Pac. 108 (1930), supports their position. Although the Prince ease has some dicta language in it
that might seen1 to the contrary, the ease does not rneet
the issue presented in this case. In Prince, the only is:-:ue
relevant to this c.ase was an instruction given hy the
trial court on the le·sser included offense of attempted
extortion, where extortion was the offense charged.
There the court properly instructed on the failure to consummate the principal offense, a problen1 not here involved. See quote from Perkins, infra p. 20. This court
approved the instruction, saying it 'vas not erroneous,
.and in doing so 1nerely noted the conlillon law eiements
of atternpt, quoting Corpus Juris. The court was not
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concerned with whether a failure of consunnnation is an
ele1nent of attempt under the Utah statute where an attempt is charged and the evidence borders on consummation of the cri1ne. Thus the case did not concern itself
with the legal issue present in this ca:se, and did not
analyze the Ftah statute against a similar fact situation.
Consequently, the Prince case hardly can be called precedent for the proposition now being urged on appeal.
Finally, it is submitted that no prejudice can be
claimed in view of the overwhehning evidenee of guilt of
at least an attempt, and the fa:et tha:t an attempt is the
least offense of which the .appellants eould be convicted.
Obviously, they were not harmed.

POINT IV.
THE COURT COlVIlVIITTED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPALS.

The appellants contend that the trial court erred
m giving instruction 5-C relating to principals. (File
Xo. 809). In the argument in their brief, however, the
claim of error is not direeted hy appellants to .any particular appellant.
\Yhat has previously been stated before with reference to the need of the appellants to have taken exceptions to the court's instruction is .applicable in the instant case. Since no exception \vas taken to the instruction, no clajm of error can be urged before this eourt,
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s1nce obviously the instruction was not so palpabl~~ Prroneous that it denied the appellants a fair trial.
Even so, the whole of the instruction given should
be examined to asce-rtain if it resulted in prejudice to
the defendants or either of then1, and should also be
examined against the totality of the instructions and
weighed for specific prejudice. State v. Siddotcay, 61
Utah 189, 211 Pac. 9()8 (1922). The full instruction given
in the instant case was :
"You are instructed that all persons concerned in the cmnmission of the crime whether
they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its cmnmission are principals in any crime cmnmitted, and are guilty of
committing such offense.
"In this connection when you conS'ider the elelnents of the crime of attempted burglary in the
second degree, if you believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that one of the defendants did the act constituting such offense, and that the other defendant knowingly aided and abetted such person in
the conunission of said attempted burglary in
the second degree, then each of the defendants
would be guilty of such offense.
"In this connection you are instructed that
·when you consider the evidence of the offense
of assault with a deadly weapon, if you believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
Spencer actually did the shooting, and performed
all of the requirements for said offense, and that
the defendant Rowley was knowingly aiding and
abetting said Spencer in the commission of such
offense, then the defendant Rowley and the de-
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fendant Spencer would each be guilty of such offense."
Thus the court did not merely limit the instruction
to an abstract principle of law, but rather in accord with
previous directions from this court, it tailored the instruction to 1neet the particular evidentiary issues raised
at trial. State v. Thompson, 110 l~tah 113, 170 P.2d 153.
The appellant contends that the decision of this court
in State L·. Baunt, -17 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915), supports the position that the court's instruction in the instant case was erroneous. In the Baum case the defendant was convicted of burglary. It appeared that the defendant entered the building in question and removed
goods therefron1. Thus the evidence in the Baum case
specifically showed the participation of the defendant,
and m.ade the instruction as to aiding and abetting the
commission of the crime erroneous. The facts of the
instant case are not of that nature. In the Baum case
this court noted of the instruction given, which is similar
of the first paragraph of the instruction given in this
ea~e:

"Such a charge may be proper enough in a
proper case. ~ ~ *"
Thus the court noted there was nothing inherently
erroneous in the instruction given, and indicated ·where
the facts warrant it such an instruction is proper. In thP
instant case the evidence was not clear as to the attempted burglary charge as to what part each defendant
played. The evidence showed both defendants as being
present, but it did not show what part tlH-'Y specifically
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played in cutting into the roof, using the· tools, etc. An
inference of joint participation based upon circumstantial e~idence, including the fact that Rowley as well m;
Spencer ·were anned, and Rowley apparently drove the
vehicle in aid of their escape frmn the scene of the crime
and was also pre·sent at the scene, was enough to warrant ·an instruction being given on the law of prineipals.
In addition, it should be noted that the court i:ipecifically
tailored the instruction on principals to fit Rowley's situation on the question of assault with a deadly weapon.
His presence was only circum:stantially shown, whereas
Spencer's direet commission of the act was apparent.
Rowley's participation was also shown by his operating
the escape vehicle, and carrying a gun. This demonstrates that he acted in concert with Spencer. Consequently, the instruction, carefully drawn as it ,,~a~,
was absolutely correct. In People L Piane.z::.i, 42 C.A.
2d 270, 108 P. 2d 685 (1940), a murder case, a similar
fact situation raised a similar objection. The California
court failed to find any in1proprety, and stated:
"The instructions set forth in paragraphs (e)
and (f) of defendant's fifth proposition were likewise properly read to the jury. Frmn the evidence in the present case it appears that two or
n1ore pers·ons participated in the murders of
which defendant stands convicted. The court,
therefore, properly gave an instruction in the
language of section 971 of the Penal Code, for
it nray be that the jury believed from the evidence
that defendant did not fire the shot which killed
decedent Greuzard but that one of the other participants in the crime did so, and that defendant
aided and abetted in the commission of the offense."
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A si1nilar result was reached in Schreiuer v. People,
360 P. :2d -!-!3 (Colo. 1961), where the Colorado court
commented:

""'" * ~· It is obvious that coloring this entire
assignment of error is the belief that because, the
People's theory of the case ·was that defendant
was physically present in the pharmacy, .an instruction on accessory is thereby rendered inapplicable. Such is not the law. T'he statute
quoted, supra, clearly states that one who is
present .and aids, abets or assists is deemed, considered and punished as a principal. \Vhere, as
here, two persons are acting in concert, one holding the victims at bay, the other emptying the
cash register, an instruction on accessory is in
order. In the a;bsence of such .an instruction the
jury might conceivably acquit the one who held
the victims at bay in the mistaken belief that since
he did not personally ta:ke the money from the
register he was therefore innocent of the charge
of robbery. It has long been the law in Colorado
that an accessory who stands by and aids in the
perpetration of a crime may properly be charged
as .a principal, and in the case of co-defendants it
is unnecessary to spell out which one is the principal and which the accessory, nor is it necessary
to chara:cterize and classify the specific acts of
each. * * *"
Clearly, where the' evidence in the instant case inferentially raises a probability of guilt by virtue of being
an aiding principal, the 'jnstruction was proper.
Finally, it is submitted no prejudice could occur
even if such instructon were deerned errone~ous. Wilson
'~"· StatP, 150 Xeb. 436, 34 N.vV. :2cl 880 (1948).

It is obvious that appellants have no clain1 for reversal on this point.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants have raised several claims of error, all
of Which are raised for the first tin1e on appeal, and
all of which, when analyzed for legal merit and compared
against the factual certainty of the guilt of the appellants, demonstrates only that the jury rendered a proper
verdict in accordance with due process and es:-;ential
justice.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully :submitted,
A. PRATT !(ESLER,
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE,
Chief Assistant Atty. Gent-ral
Attorneys for Respondent
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